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1. Introduction  
Executive compensation remains one of the most widely discussed governance issues in the UK 
where it continues to attract the attention of the business community, academics, and the popular press. 
Numerous calls for improving the code of good practice for managerial remuneration contracting and 
for stronger shareholder involvement in the pay-setting process followed the dispute over the pay of the 
GlaxoSmithKline’s CEO Jean-Paul Garnier in 2003. This shareholder revolt against corporate ‘fat cats’ 
and the concerns of the investment community were voiced as follows: 
Companies must be free to run themselves as they think best and to pay their executives 
appropriately. But they must also act responsibly when company performance is poor. 
Shareholders must hold them to that responsibility, and ensure that the days of the overfed 
felines are numbered (The Times, May 20, 2003). 
However, governance problems pertaining to managerial compensation do not appear to be confined 
either to the UK or the first years of the 21st century as the recent financial crisis put the issue into 
the spotlights again: 
As you may have noticed, pay is back on the corporate governance agenda in a big way. As the 
regulatory response to the credit crisis on both sides of the Atlantic begins to take shape, it is 
looking increasingly likely that remuneration will be a key area of consideration for both investors 
and other interested parties. The current crisis is leading to a fairly fundamental reappraisal of 
financial markets and how key organisations within them operate, and remuneration surely cannot 
avoid an overhaul (The Financial Times, August 18, 2008).  
Over the 1990s, the UK corporate governance regime experienced a series of sweeping 
governance reforms initiated by the Code of Best Practice (so-called Cadbury report) in 1992 (and 
incorporate in the listing rules of the LSE in July 1993) and then followed by Greenbury report in 1995, 
Hampel report in 1998, and, finally enshrined in the Combined Code of Corporate Governance in 1998 
[51]. While some evidence exists on the effects of the earlier reforms, in particular of the Cadbury 
report (see e.g. [23] and [34]) for the effects of the Code introduction on CEO dismissal and executive 
compensation, respectively), this paper provides a comprehensive examination of managerial 
remuneration and disciplining in the UK in both the pre-reform period (i.e. before 1993) and in the post-




reform period (i.e. as of 1998). It allows us to rigorously assess the efficiency of the governance 
changes and relate to the critics claiming that the recommendations of the British governance 
committees did not have sufficient clout to curb the excesses in managerial compensation (see e.g. [50] 
and the quotes above). One of the main deficiencies of widely-held public corporations – ‘strong 
managers, weak owners’, in the words of Roe [60] – may actually have led to a situation where the 
mechanisms meant to improve the governance standards like performance-related pay are misused by 
powerful directors to extract substantial rents from the companies they work for [9]: 
One of the really alarming aspects of global capitalism during the 1990s was the increasing 
disconnect between the managerial cadres who ran companies and shareholders who owned 
them. Managers and the boards that appointed them stopped seeing themselves as custodians of 
other people’s money and became a self-serving interest group, dedicated to grabbing more of 
the cake (The Independent, May 21, 2003). 
The early agency literature stipulates that shareholders' interests can be protected because 
managerial incentives can be (re)structured. As such, managers attempt to avoid poor performance due 
to the threat of dismissal and are stimulated to reach strong corporate performance as a result of the 
rewarding and incentive effects of compensation contracts [40, 56]. However, more recent US empirical 
literature casts doubt on the hypothesis of alignment of interests which may be brought about by pay-
for-(stock price) performance contracts and performance-related dismissals. For instance, Bebchuk and 
Fried’s [7] ‘managerial power model’ points out that executive compensation should be seen as a 
manifestation of agency problems rather than a solution if remuneration contracting is not embedded in 
a proper governance system. Likewise, Bertrand and Mullainathan [11, 12] give evidence that the 
performance-related contracts in the US do not correct for windfall profits which are not related to 
managerial efforts or skill, and that CEOs are hence paid for luck. Furthermore, they propose a model 
whereby ‘agents without principals’ (managers without proper governance mechanisms like a 
monitoring blockholder) are skimming corporate profits. Our results give a nuanced picture for the UK. 
We show evidence of contractual alignment, but we also detect circumstances which point at the danger 
of managerial self-dealing (in particular, in the pre-reform period). Self-dealing may particularly arise 
in firms where CEOs have a lot of discretion in decision making, which may result from a lack of 




monitoring by outside shareholders or the board of directors. Some of our results show indeed that 
powerful CEOs are shielded from forced departures and seem able to choose their preferred 
remuneration-related performance benchmark. This study thus contributes to recent literature on the 
alignment versus skimming hypotheses, and focuses on the UK.  
Although a large body of academic literature exists (especially for the US) on both managerial 
disciplining and managerial compensation, these two aspects of the managerial labor market are usually 
–with the notable exception of Coughlan and Schmidt [21]– treated separately. However, the two 
governance mechanisms in question are likely to be intertwined such that the results of studies of 
executive turnover and of managerial remuneration in isolation are likely to be biased. Furthermore, 
each of these governance mechanisms only addresses the agency problems at specific ranges of 
corporate performance. For instance, performance-sensitive managerial compensation contracts are only 
designed for average or high levels of performance because management may not be induced to 
generate further efforts when they realize that the minimal performance thresholds triggering bonuses 
are out of reach. Likewise, Jensen and Murphy [42] argue that the probability of CEO dismissal is too 
low to align effectively the interests of managers and owners. Consequently, in order to cover a more 
complete spectrum of incentives, the carrot (performance-related compensation) and the stick 
(dismissal) need to be studied simultaneously. A simultaneous treatment of both governance 
mechanisms econometrically translates into a Heckman sample selection model (type-2 Tobit). This 
technique mitigates the sample selection biases induced by sample endogeneity affecting many of the 
studies analyzing managerial compensation. We document that our estimation technique yields 
unbiased results as opposed to fixed-effects panel data regressions. Our paper contributes to the 
literature by correcting the findings of earlier UK research which fell short of finding a relation between 
managerial remuneration and corporate performance (or documented a very weak relation). The lack of 
performance sensitivity in earlier UK studies may result from the biases induced by inappropriate 
estimation methodologies or may be due to benchmarking problems (we study a wide set of industry-
adjusted performance measures).  
We analyze listed UK firms and find the CEO compensation to be performance-sensitive: 
remuneration rewards either past good accounting or stock price performance. Nevertheless, we cannot 




unambiguously show that remuneration contracts align the interests of managers and shareholders, nor 
can we demonstrate that the skimming/managerial power model is valid in all cases. The fact that the 
levels of CEO compensation are lower when executive directors are powerful (in terms of voting rights) 
supports the alignment of interest-hypothesis. However, for the pre-reform period, we find that when 
firms incur negative abnormal returns and their CEOs derive substantial wealth from the equity 
investment in their firms, CEOs compensate the disappointing stock performance by augmenting their 
monetary compensation. This suggests self-dealing and therefore provides some support for the 
skimming or managerial power theory. CEOs who also exert the function of chairman (and hence 
dominate the board) earn more when accounting performance is high (but not when share price 
performance has increased). Thus, powerful managers seem to prefer accounting standards as an 
evaluation criterion, presumably because they have more discretion over this benchmark and hence over 
their monetary compensation. In contrast, in firms with strong outsider (monitoring) shareholders, 
management cannot pick its preferred performance benchmark as it is required to focus on the creation 
of shareholder value. The aforementioned relation between CEO power and the intricacies of pay-
performance sensitivity persist in the post-reform years. In both periods analyzed, the CEOs of 
monitored firms (in particular of firms where non-executive directors and outside shareholders control 
large share blocks) enjoy lower remuneration, irrespectively of performance.  
In the pre-reform period, there are few characteristics of the board structure (apart from the 
separation of CEO and chairman) which have an impact on the pay-for-performance sensitivity. The 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board does not seem to have an impact on the 
remuneration policy of the firm. Furthermore, the presence of a remuneration committee has no 
significant impact either. In this respect, our results appear consistent with the widely perceived failure 
of this mechanism in tackling governance problems. Interestingly, in the post-reform period, a larger 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board weakens the link between CEO compensation and 
accounting performance measure. 
We also analyze the termination of a CEO employment contract. First, we find that CEO 
replacement rates are comparable in pre- and post-reform periods. Second, involuntary or forced 
turnover is performance-sensitive in both periods. Third, outside shareholders (institutions, families or 




individuals, other corporations) do not seem to be involved in general in disciplining the CEO even in 
the wake of poor performance (in either of the periods). In line with earlier research, we find that prior 
to the governance reforms of the 1990s, non-executive directors owning share blocks seem to protect 
the incumbent CEO in poorly performing companies, while in the post-reform period this effect is no 
longer significant (in line with the codes’ spirit of fostering non-executive directors’ governance role). 
Fourth, CEOs also holding the positions of chairmen of the board successfully impede replacement 
irrespective of corporate performance in the pre-reform period. Finally, until 1993, large boards and 
boards with a high proportion of non-executive directors replace the CEO more frequently. However, 
these boards are not more apt to replace underperforming management in either the pre-reform or the 
post-reform period.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the research hypotheses 
are motivated. Section 3 discusses the sample selection procedure, describes the variables and reveals 
the data sources. In the same section, the different estimation techniques are explained. Section 4 
presents the results, while Section 5 discusses detailed robustness tests. The conclusions are presented 
in Section 6.  
2. Determinants of CEO compensation and of managerial turnover  
2.1. Background agency literature  
 Coughlan and Schmidt [21] were the first to document that the likelihood of forced turnover is 
a decreasing function of corporate performance; a finding further corroborated by an extensive literature 
(a.o. [24] for the US, and [23] and [29] for the UK).1  The theoretical blueprint of pay-for-performance 
remuneration was laid by the principal-agent models of Jensen and Meckling [41], and Grossman and 
                                                 
1 The disciplinary character of managerial turnover is influenced by board size [67], board composition [65], 
ownership structure [25], and is industry-dependent [59]. Forced executive resignations in the US are usually 
accompanied by positive and statistically significant abnormal stock performance, provided that an outsider is 
appointed as the CEO [61]. 




Hart[36].2 The performance-sensitivity of managerial compensation is empirically well documented for 
US firms (e.g. [42]): executive pay depends on both past stock returns and past accounting measures 
[63] as well as on relative measures of performance [31]. Still, the level of executive compensation 
depends not only on past performance; also important are company size [34, 55] and CEO age and 
tenure [19].3 The optimal balance of stock-based and monetary compensation solves a trade-off 
between short- and long-term incentives [57].  
The recent literature criticizes the agency approach that considers managerial compensation as 
the optimal outcome of the contracting problem [7, 11]. According to the ‘skimming model’ of the 
executive remuneration, directors are able to set their own (excessive) pay in firms with inferior 
governance standards [12]. Apart from the availability of funds, the only constraint deemed to curb such 
a managerial discretion is the fear of causing ‘outrage’ among shareholders potentially angered by 
excessive pay of the company’s executives [8].  
2.2. Motivation of hypotheses 
The impact of the various corporate mechanisms (internal devices such as board composition, 
pay-for-performance, and external mechanisms such as ownership concentration by type of 
shareholder) will vary over time and their effectiveness will depend on the regulatory framework. Over 
the past 15 years, several important regulations were introduced. The Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance was launched in 1998 and united 3 earlier corporate governance codes: (i) the Cadbury 
report on good governance which was introduced in December 1992 (and included in the listing rules of 
the London Stock Exchange in July 1993), (ii) the Greenbury report of 1995 on remuneration 
                                                 
2 A multi-period setting has enabled the analysis of career concerns that also affect executive compensation 
contracts [15,33]. 
3 Furthermore, the following characteristics also explain managerial remuneration: ownership structure [20], board 
composition [37], the threat of a takeover [4], merger and acquisition policy [33], company risk, growth 
opportunities, dividend policy [49], the country where the company is operating [19], and the gender of the 
executive [48]. 




transparency, and (iii) the Hampel report of 1998 which emphasized principles of good governance, 
rather than ‘box-ticking’ explicit rules [51].  
The period prior to 1993, precedes the implementation of the first of the corporate governance 
reports adopted in the UK.4 This period is characterized by lower corporate governance standards than 
more recent years, and is therefore particularly interesting from an agency-theory point of view. Our 
second six-year sample period, labeled the post-form period, covers the years following the adoption of 
the Combined Code (1999-2004). Using two time periods enables us to better assess the efficiency of 
improved governance standards as recommended by the codes. In the remainder of this subsection, we 
formulate our main hypotheses on the governance effects on turnover and on remuneration. We also 
indicate in which time period – the pre-reform or post-reform period – we expect the hypotheses to hold 
(more strongly).   
The importance of the disciplining role of managerial dismissals is widely accepted. Still, 
setting a correct performance yardstick is problematic as both accounting and stock price performance 
have some deficiencies. Accounting information records only past corporate performance and can be 
manipulated over a period of several years by top management (see e.g. [16]). Stock price performance 
captures the firm’s ability to generate value in the future and may hence already include the effects of 
an expected change in CEO. Therefore, we argue that both stock- and accounting-based measures of 
performance provide incremental information about executives’ productivity.  
Decisions about hiring and firing top management are ultimately taken by the board of 
directors.5 The higher the degree of independence of the board from top management, the higher the 
level of performance-induced turnover is likely to be. Still, the empirical US literature comes up with 
conflicting results.6 For the UK, Franks et al. [29] find that a high proportion of independent directors 
                                                 
4 The Cadbury report was first published in December 1992; it is possible that some firms may have adopted some 
of the Cadbury recommendations in the final year of our first sample.  
5 Throughout the paper, we use the UK definition of a director. A UK board of directors consists of executive 
directors (frequently called officers in the US) and non-executive directors (called directors in the US).  
6 Weisbach [65] shows that board structure affects the likelihood of disciplinary turnover: poorly performing 
CEOs are more frequently fired provided that the board is outsider-dominated. This conclusion is challenged by 




does not lead to stronger managerial disciplining in poorly performing firms, while this conclusion is 
challenged by Dahya et al. [23]. According to Franks et al. [29] what does seem to matter is separating 
the functions of the CEO and the chairman of the board. Also, Yermack [67] reports that smaller boards 
operate more efficiently as they are more prone to replace underperforming CEOs of the US companies.  
Hypothesis 1a (Governance effects on turnover): Board independence positively affects the likelihood 
of managerial turnover in poorly-performing firms. An inverse relation is expected for board size.  
As there are hardly any requirements in corporate law on board structure in the pre-reform 
period, we expect a stronger impact of board structure on turnover in the post-reform period (following 
the arguments by Dahya et al. [23]). An alternative hypothesis is that in the post-reform period, the 
board structures (degree of independence, number of non-executive directors, separation of the 
positions of CEO and chairman etc.) do not vary to a large degree due to the implementation of the 
governance recommendations. Therefore the impact of board structure on turnover is marginal. If it 
were the case, superior internal board mechanisms (such as board independence which can be expected 
to stimulate good governance) may only make a difference in the pre-reform period.  
The essence of the agency literature is that, in order to induce agents to exert (costly) effort, the 
principal has to provide them with appropriate incentives. Jensen and Meckling [41] suggest (partial) 
equity ownership by managers as a way of mitigating this problem, but Murphy [56] finds only little 
empirical support for this mechanism. Fama [28] discounts the idea of pay-for-performance contracts 
for managers with short track records because, if managers believe that subsequent wage offers will 
depend on current levels of performance, they will work hard today to build up reputational value 
independent of incentive compensation. Holmström [40] challenges this idea and shows that although 
                                                                                                                                                          
Mikkelson and Partch [54] and Agrawal and Knoeber [3] who show that managerial turnover is unrelated to board 
composition. Instead, turnover seems to result mainly from the pressure of the takeover market [52]. Importantly, 
more recent studies (e.g. [1], [62]) tend to suggest that executive turnover appears beneficial to shareholders, in 
particular, if the departing CEO is strongly entrenched. 




the effects of labor-market discipline can be substantial, it is not a perfect substitute for contracts.7 
Gibbons and Murphy [32] extend the Holmström [40] model by introducing Fama’s [28] reputation 
concept and show that the best compensation contract optimizes total incentives (the combination of the 
implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract). 
Managerial compensation schemes may be an appropriate device complementing performance-
related turnover for the following reasons. First, many managers can be subjected to this incentive 
mechanism, while performance-induced disciplinary turnover only affects a few top managers. Second, 
for industries where industry-specific skills are required, performance-based compensation is likely to 
be a more effective solution to agency problems than the threat of dismissal. Third, as disciplinary 
turnover penalizes underperformance, the mere fact of being able to avoid poor performance (and, 
hence dismissal) does not constitute the right incentive for well-performing managers to pursue a value-
maximizing strategy. If higher managerial effort induces better corporate performance, then there is an 
important rewarding role for performance-dependent bonus and option schemes. However, imperfect 
observability of top management’s actions creates opportunities for moral hazard that adversely affect 
the contracting with a manager [39]. The efficiency of contracting can be improved by using 
informative signals about executives’ effort. Following this argument, Bushman and Indjejikan [15], 
and Kim and Suh [47] develop models in which the CEO’s compensation depends on both accounting- 
and stock-based performance measures. Both indicators are considered noisy signals of managerial 
effort, but as long as they are incrementally informative about managerial actions, they enter a 
performance-dependent wage formula with non-zero weight.8  
Corporate governance standards influence the terms of CEO remuneration contracts [12]: the 
degree of independence of the board of directors may have a direct impact on managerial compensation 
as it is the non-executive directors (or their representatives in the remuneration committee) who set the 
remuneration contracts. In a firm whose board of directors is dominated by a powerful CEO (for 
                                                 
7 In the absence of contracts, managers work too hard in their early years (when market is still assessing the 
manager's ability) and not hard enough in later years. 
8 This argument of using both types of performance measures (stock- and accounting-based) as determinants of 
CEO compensation is also invoked in some of the empirical literature for US firms [20, 45, 53].   




instance, when he or she also serves as the chairperson), the terms of the top management’s 
remuneration contracts are more likely to be influenced by the CEO [9]. Yermack [67] also argues that 
smaller boards appear to act more frequently in the shareholders’ interest than larger boards. In 
particular, he documents an inverse relationship between board size and the performance sensitivity of 
managerial compensation.   
Hypothesis 1b (Governance effects on compensation): Board independence positively affects 
performance sensitivity of the CEO’s compensation. An inverse relation is expected for board size. 
We expect the above hypothesis to be supported more strongly in the post-reform period as it 
may take a strong non-executive board/remuneration committee to impose an effective pay-for-
performance mechanism.9 
For the US, there is ample evidence that forced turnover follows from monitoring by large 
(activist) block holders and by the external market for corporate control (e.g. [13], [26]). For UK firms, 
Franks et al. [29] confirm that these mechanisms also play a leading role in the replacement of 
management. The intensity of monitoring may not only depend on mere ownership concentration, but 
also on the type of blockholders. In particular, substantial insider ownership may lead to managerial 
entrenchment, which decreases the performance-sensitivity of managerial turnover and reduces the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal [22]. In contrast, outside blockholders may hold management responsible 
for poor performance and attempt to remove them.  
Hypothesis 2a (Blockholder identity effect on turnover): The type of controlling shareholders affects 
the likelihood of managerial turnover: monitoring by outside blockholders (institutions, families and 
individuals, industrial firms) leads to increased performance-related CEO removal, whereas insider 
blockholders impede top executive changes in underperforming firms. 
We expect a stronger relation between the presence of share blocks and forced of top 
management for the post-reform period. The reason is that shareholders have become better informed as 
                                                 
9 However, following the reforms, there may be less cross-firm variability in board independence such that it may 
be more difficult to discern the effect of board independence on pay-performance sensitivity. 




a consequence of the increased corporate transparency requested in the various codes constituting the 
Combined Code. Furthermore, shareholders have become more vocal and activist (at annual meetings 
and behind the scenes (see e.g. [10]) 
Shareholders monitor the firm when their share stakes are sufficiently large and the benefits 
from monitoring exceed the costs [46]. Such powerful shareholders may also set the terms of CEO 
employment contracts. Clay [17] argues that monitoring activities are delegated to some classes of 
owners and that the presence of activist shareholders leads to higher levels of CEO compensation and 
increasing performance-sensitivity. In contrast, in firms where managers control large equity stakes 
and/or where the ownership is diffuse, managers are likely to enjoy a high level of decision discretion 
such that they can promote compensation schemes with only a limited relation to share price 
performance.10  
Hypothesis 2b (Blockholder identity effect on compensation): The presence of strong outside 
blockholders positively affects the performance sensitivity of the CEO’s compensation, whereas the 
presence of large executive directors’ holdings induces the opposite effect. 
 We expect that Hypothesis 2b is more strongly supported in the post-reform period. The reason 
is that subsequent to 1995, firms ought to introduce pay-for-performance in their remuneration contracts 
and were expected to disclose the contract details of all the executive and non-executive directors. 
While stopping short of mandating shareholders’ vote-on-pay at annual general meetings (AGMs), the 
Greenbury Report actively encourages shareholders to voice their concerns in the form of resolutions at 
the AGMs and recommends that executive long-term incentive schemes be approved by shareholders. 
The discussion above leaves out one potentially important group of shareholders, namely non-
executive directors. The relationship between the size of their equity stakes and CEO compensation or 
turnover is an open empirical issue. On the one hand, if non-executive directors assume their fiduciary 
duties appropriately and act in the interest of all shareholders, the impact of non-executives’ voting 
power on CEO compensation and turnover will be similar to that of the outside blockholders (postulated 
                                                 
10 Managers would then prefer remuneration packages related to accounting benchmarks as these can to some 
extent be manipulated by management [43].  




by Hypotheses 2a and 2b). On the other hand, if non-executive directors believe that their careers are 
closely tied to the fate of the incumbent CEO, they may opt to support the incumbent management and 
shield them from disciplinary actions. This would be in line with the findings of Franks et al. [29] who 
argue that non-executive directors frequently support the incumbent management even in the wake of 
poor performance. Thus, while testing for Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we control for the size of equity 
holdings controlled by non-executive directors, but a priori we do not hypothesize about the direction 
of the effect. 
3. Sample description and methodological approach  
3.1. Sample description and data sources 
We analyze and compare the determinants of managerial compensation and turnover between 
two six-year periods: the pre-reform period (1988-1993) and the post-reform period (1999-2004). The 
pre-reform period precedes the implementation of the first of the corporate governance report adopted in 
the UK.11 The post-form period, covers the years following the adoption of the Combined Code in 
1998.12  
The pre-reform period sample consists of 250 UK firms and is randomly drawn from the 
population of UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, excluding financial institutions, real 
estate companies and insurance companies. For a company to be included in the sample, we require that 
data are available for at least three consecutive years within the six years time window. Hence, the 
sample also includes those firms that were taken over or went bankrupt. Seven of the 250 companies 
were dropped because accounting data were not available from Datastream. All data on managerial 
compensation, turnover and board composition for the pre-reform sample were hand-collected and 
retrieved from the Directors’ Report and the Notes in the annual reports. The same source is used to 
                                                 
11 It is possible that some firms may have adopted some of the Cadbury recommendations in the final year of our 
first sample. Excluding year 1993 from our data does not materially influence the results presented in this paper.  
12 It should be noted that the Combined Code was amended in 2003 (when the Higgs report on a more active and 
independent role of non-executive directors was published) and in 2007 [30, 51]. We only study the impact of the 
main regulatory changes (which took place between 1993 and 1998.  




collect ownership data for each year of the period 1988-1993. All the directors' holdings greater than 
0.1% are recorded as well as other shareholders' stakes of 5% and more (3% and above from 1990 when 
the statutory disclosure threshold was reduced). The status of the directors (executive/non-executive) 
and the dates of joining and leaving the board were also obtained from the annual reports and from 
contacting the firms directly by phone or fax. Non-beneficial share stakes held by the directors on behalf 
of their families or charitable trusts were added to the directors' beneficial holdings. Although directors 
do not obtain cash flow benefits from these non-beneficial stakes, they can usually exercise the voting 
rights. For equity stakes in Nominees accounts, the identity of the shareholders was found by contacting 
the listed firms directly. In 97% of these cases, the shareholders of Nominees accounts were institutional 
investors. 
The post-reform sample is much more comprehensive and it is the intersection of the three 
databases: BoardEx (for managerial compensation, turnover, and board composition data), Worldscope 
(for accounting and other financial data) and the Price Waterhouse Coopers ownership database. This 
procedure yields a sample of 1,407 UK companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange (which 
corresponds to a sample of 6,424 CEO-years). The ownership database provides information on all the 
holdings of the company directors and all the holdings of 3% or above for the other shareholders. The 
procedures for classifying non-beneficial stakes and Nominee accounts in the post-reform sample are the 
same as the ones outlined above for the pre-reform sample. 
3.2. Variable definitions and data description 
In our pre-reform sample, approximately 11% of CEOs lost their position in a given year (Table 
1), while the number for the post-reform period is slightly lower at 9.9%. This result is different from 
the one obtained by Dahya et al. [23] who document the increase in turnover rates following the 
implementation of the Cadbury code. The turnover data are corrected for natural turnover.13 As 
                                                 
13 We distinguish between natural and forced turnover, classifying a resignation as ‘natural’ if the director was 
described as having left the board for reasons of retirement, death or illness. Otherwise the resignation was 
classified as being forced. The normal retirement age is between 62 and 65 but we took 62 as the minimum 
retirement age and viewed any earlier retirement as forced unless the databases employed provided details of the 
stipulated retirement age for a particular CEO (this information was only available for the post-reform sample). 




expected, CEO turnover most of turnover occurs in the lowest quintile of corporate performance. The 
median and mean logarithm of the monetary compensation (salary and bonus) in the pre-reform period 
was 11.88 and 11.91, respectively (which corresponds to £144,000 and £149,000). Expectedly, the 
corresponding numbers for the 1999-2004 sample are higher at 12.65 and 12.69, respectively 
(equivalent to £312,000 and £326,000). The improved disclosure requirements following the 
implementation of the Greenbury report (of 1995) enable us a more detailed analysis of the equity-
based components of the compensation package.14 These components (stocks, options, and Long-Term 
Incentive Plans or LTIPs) constitute a substantial part of the total CEO compensation in the post reform 
period: the mean and median logarithms of total compensation are equal to 12.93 and 13.01, 
respectively (which correspond to £413,000 and £448,000). 
The median age of a CEO is 52 years (with a mean of 52.6) for the pre-reform sample. The 
numbers for the post-reform sample (51 and 50.5, respectively) are slightly lower. While in the 1988-
1993 period the median tenure equaled 4 years (with a mean of 5.2), it was considerably shorted in the 
period 1999-2004 with a median (mean) tenure is merely 2.9 (4.9) years. In the pre-reform period, 
every third CEO also held the position of the chairman of the board of directors, but this proportion has 
decreases substantially following the corporate governance codes (as in the Combined Code) to about 
15%.  
We observe a decrease in board size over time: while in the pre-reform period the median board 
consists of 9 directors, the corresponding board size in the post-reform period is 7. Finally, in 
approximately 26% of the sample firm-years from the pre-reform period, CEO compensation is 
                                                 
14 For the pre-reform period, only rudimentary information about equity-based CEO remuneration is disclosed. 
The annual reports usually only mention that management options had been granted during the financial year 
and/or were outstanding without consistently revealing the number of options involved, the exercise price, and the 
number of options exercised in the preceding year. As a robustness check, we investigate whether the equity-
based remuneration influences the cash-based pay-for-performance relation by expanding the main models for the 
pre-reform sample with proxies of equity-based compensation in the pre-reform sample. We include proxies for 
the size of the stock/option grants, for the value of the CEO’s stock grants, and for the wealth effects of CEO’s 
equity holdings (see Section 5.2 for detailed definitions and the results).  




determined by a remuneration committee. In our post-reform sample, virtually all firms have such a 
committee.  
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
 As is typical for Anglo-American firms, the ownership concentration is relatively low (Table 
1). Most CEOs do not hold very substantial share stakes, but the corresponding numbers increase in 
recent years: the average CEO in the pre-reform period owns 2.8%, whereas the corresponding number 
for the post-reform period amounts to 4.5%. In the pre-reform period, the median of the combined 
shareholdings of all executive directors (excluding the CEO) is 0.1%, with an average of about 4.6%. 
After 1999, the numbers increase to 1.3% and 6.0%, respectively. The average combined stakes of the 
non-executives do not exceed 4% in either period. The most important class of blockholders is the 
financial institutions: they hold a (cumulative) median stake of 13.0% (with a mean of 16.6%) over the 
1988-1993 period. The importance of this class of blockholders increased further in post-reform period: 
their median (average) blockholding amounts then to 22.5% (24.6%). Finally, other outsiders – 
individuals, families and industrial firms – control on average 8.2% of equity in the pre-reform period 
and 5.2% in the post-reform period.    
In order to control for (potential) size effects, we introduce the logarithm of total assets (in 
£ thousands) at the end of a given year. For the median (mean) company in our pre-reform sample, this 
the total assets equal approximately £85 million (£78 million). For the 1999-2004 sample, the 
corresponding number is £142 million (£166 million). The median and mean ratios of capital gearing 
(defined as long term-debt on total assets) equal 29.7% and 32.7%, respectively, for the pre-reform 
sample, and 16.5% and 21.4%, respectively for the post-reform sample. We measure risk by the annual 
volatility of stock returns: the median (mean) values in the pre-reform and post-reform periods amount 
to 34.4% (37.4%) and 30.3% (33.0%), respectively. Finally, we employ annual abnormal stock returns15 
as well as return on assets (ROA) to capture corporate stock performance.       
                                                 
15 For pre-reform period, stock return data are collected from the London Share Price Database (LSPD). Both a 
Dimson [27] correction for non-synchronous trading and a Vasicek [64] Bayesian updating are applied. For the 
post-reform period, we employ the Worldscope data to compute abnormal returns. 




3.3. Methodology  
 We simultaneously explain managerial turnover and compensation within a sample selection 
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oncompensatiObserved  (3) 
where  itit 21  ,  are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0, variances 21  and 22 , 
and covariance 12  [5].16 1  and 2  are vectors of the model coefficients. In our models, i 
corresponds to a firm and t to a year. *itTurnover  and 
*
itonCompensati  are underlying latent variables 
that are not observable. However, the sign of the *itTurnover  variable can be observed and coded as a 
binary variable CEO_stayedit: if a CEO lost his or her job (i.e., 0* itTurnover ) it is coded as 0, 
otherwise it is coded as 1. Obviously, compensation is only observed for CEOs who were not dismissed 
(see Equation 3).  
it1  and it2  are the sets of explanatory variables explaining CEO turnover and 
compensation, respectively. They include the measures of stock and accounting performance, board 
characteristics, ownership structure variables, and other control variables (e.g., leverage, firm risk, time, 
                                                 
16 In a standard setting, error terms are assumed to be i.i.d. drawings from a bivariate normal distribution. We 
relax the assumption of independence of 's across t and allow clustering of observations corresponding to a given 
firm, i.e. we assume error terms to be i.i.d. across firms, but not necessarily for different observations within the 
same firm. All the reported standard errors of estimates are adjusted for clustering. This procedure enhances 
robustness of our findings and allows us to take the panel data structure of our sample explicitly into account. To 
estimate the type-2 Tobit models, we employ a two-step procedure suggested by Heckman [38], which yields 
consistent parameter estimates. 




or industry dummies). The two sets of explanatory variables, i.e., itX1  and itX 2 , are not disjoint (they 
can differ, however).  
 Throughout the paper we call Equation 1a the selection equation, while Equation 1b is the 
regression equation. The selection equation explains CEO turnover, i.e., 1_ itstayedCEO  
corresponds to those firm-years when the CEO keeps his or her position. The regression equation 
explains the compensation of these CEOs in the subsequent year. As the notion of compensation 
sensitivity to previous year performance is not meaningful for new CEOs, we restrict the remuneration 
analysis to CEOs with tenures of more than one year. Estimating the parameters of the regression 
Equation 1b on the basis of the non-turnover sample only, would not be a valid alternative to the 
proposed method because the OLS estimator of 2  is biased when the selection of the regression 
sample is endogenous (i.e., 012  ). Instead, our sample selection model deals with the endogeneity 
of selection, and therefore renders reliable parameter estimates for the regression equation [35].  
Our hypotheses are tested within Tobit-2 models with interaction terms. We allow the 
explanatory variables to be time-varying, which results in multiple observations for each of the 
analyzed firms. In order to assure the robustness of the results, we account for a possible dependence 
between different observations corresponding to the same firm. We allow for clustering and implement 
the procedure which assumes the observations to be independent across firms, but does not require 
different observations on the same firm to be independent.  
Finally, we also analyze corporate remuneration using a fixed-effects and random effects panel 
regression framework in order to compare these estimates with the results from the sample selection 
models.17 This allows us to draw some conclusions about whether or not the fixed-effects methodology 
or simple OLS regressions, frequently used in previous research, biases the results of earlier studies.  
                                                 
17 Fixed-effects and random-effects panel regressions are often used to model executive compensation. In the 
fixed-effects approach, firm-specific effects (i.e. i's) are treated as model parameters and are hence estimated. 
The random-effect model treats i's as the result of a random draw from some distribution (e.g., the normal one). 
For a data panel like ours (relatively large number of firms drawn randomly from an even larger population of 
companies), the use of a random-effects model is recommended, as the number of parameters to be estimated is 





4.1. The impact of performance on managerial disciplining and remuneration 
In Table 2, we examine whether performance influences CEO turnover (the selection equations 
of Panel A) and industry-adjusted CEO remuneration (the regression equations of Panel B). The results 
of Panel A support the disciplinary role of managerial turnover because performance is negatively 
correlated to future turnover (Model 1A).18 In the pre-reform period, this effect is statistically 
significant for abnormal stock returns (but also for the industry-adjusted accounting-based performance 
measure reported in models presented in subsequent tables; see below). Unsurprisingly, managers 
generating strong corporate performance are more likely to keep their positions during the subsequent 
year. A more detailed analysis of the parameter estimates highlights the economic significance: for 
instance, Model 1A implies that in the pre-reform period the probability that a CEO of a well-
performing company loses his or her job is almost half of the corresponding probability for the median 
performing company. In contrast, CEOs of poorly performing firms are almost twice as likely to lose 
their jobs than their counterparts of the median performing firm.19 In the post-reform period (Models 1B 
and 1C), we find a stronger correlation with our accounting-based performance measure (return on 
assets), whereas the relation between turnover and stock performance is no longer statistically 
                                                                                                                                                          
substantially lower with this technique. Furthermore, more efficient estimates are obtained than with fixed-effects 
models. Still, the consistency criterion of such a random-effects approach requires i's to be uncorrelated with 
explanatory variables of the model, i.e. the X's [6]. Since the Hausman specification tests points out that in almost 
all our specifications this assumption is violated, we report the results from the fixed-effects approach. 
18 The performance coefficients in the regression equations are positive but this signifies that the relation between 
turnover and performance is negative because the dependent variable equals 1 if the CEO keeps his position and 0 
when he departs (for reasons other than retirement). 
19 The median firm is characterized by median values of firm-specific characteristics (performance, board 
composition, control variables). We define a well-performing company as a company where both performance 
indicators are at the top quartile of performance while control variables take median values. Finally, in a poorly 
performing firm both performance indicators are at the bottom quartile performance while control variables again 
take median values. 




significant. Consequently, in the post-reform period, the probability of a CEO losing his or her job (as 
implied by Model 1C) are equal to 8.3%, 7.2%, and 9.5% in a median, a well-performing, and a poorly-
performing company, respectively. These findings do not unequivocally show that the performance 
sensitivity of CEO turnover increased following the implementation of the Cadbury code (which is the 
conclusion of [23]).     
The regression equations in Panel B of Table 2 show a positive relation between, respectively, 
the monetary remuneration (fixed salary and bonus) and total remuneration (which also includes equity-
based compensation such as option plans and LTIPs), and abnormal returns and accounting 
performance (Models 1A-C). We do find that both for the pre- and post-reform periods, the relation 
between CEO remuneration and the accounting and stock price performance measure is positive and 
statistically significant. As frequently documented in previous research, remuneration is strongly 
dependent on firm size both in the pre- and post-reform period (see e.g. [34]). We also show that risky 
firms also reward higher salaries to their top management.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
We now perform a more detailed analysis and expand the above remuneration and turnover 
models with internal corporate governance characteristics (Section 4.2) and external governance 
devices (see Section 4.3), while controlling for firm size, risk, leverage and industry.  
4.2. Sample selection model results for CEO turnover  
4.2.1. Internal governance 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that board structure has an important impact on CEO turnover in the 
pre-reform period (Model 2A). We find that: (i) The presence of larger boards facilitates the 
replacement of the CEO. It may indeed be that larger boards represent a larger internal pool of 
managerial talent. (ii) Boards with a larger percentage of outside, independent directors replace CEOs 
more frequently. (iii) When a person fulfills the tasks of CEO and chairman of the board simultaneously 
(which is still the case in one third of the firms in the pre-reform period), the likelihood of his or her 
replacement significantly decreases. This implies that more powerful CEOs can successfully impede 
their replacement. This danger of conflicts of interest provides further support for the need to separate 




the positions of CEO and chairman (as stipulated in the Cadbury report). One would expect all of the 
above characteristics of the internal corporate governance mechanism to be much stronger related to 
turnover in the wake of poor corporate performance. We find however that this is not the case: The 
interaction terms of the proportion of non-executive directors and either of the performance measures 
are not statistically significant in the pre-reform period. Also, the degree of entrenchment (the positions 
of CEO and chairman are combined) does not affect the performance sensitivity of turnover, as the 
corresponding interaction terms are insignificant. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In the post-reform period, we find no correlation between any of the board characteristics (and 
their interactions with performance) to the likelihood of forced managerial turnover with the exception 
of CEO-chairman duality (see below). This suggests that boards with a high proportion of non-
executive directors do not appear significantly more apt to replace underperforming management. 
Hence, our results do not confirm Weisbach’s [65] findings that outsider-dominated boards, supposedly 
more independent from management, are more able to enforce disciplinary turnover. Our findings 
indicate that the main prescription of the ‘Recommendations for Good Corporate Governance’ (the 
1992 Cadbury report and its successors), i.e. strengthening the role of non-executive directors, may not 
be as effective as it is assumed. 
Interestingly, the effect of CEO-Chairman duality gets reversed in the post-reform period: 
CEOs who are also chairmen are more likely to lose the CEO position. As the governance codes 
recommend the separation of the two positions, it may be the case that in the post-reform period, the 
cases where CEOs also act as chairmen reflect temporary solutions to the succession planning (e.g. 
CEO holds on to both jobs until a suitable replacement can be found for one the positions (frequently 
that of the CEO whereby the person in question subsequently only retains the position of non-executive 
chairman). As before, the interactions of the CEO-chairman duality variables with performance do not 
significantly affect the likelihood of CEO turnover. Thus, we conclude that our analysis fails to support 
Hypothesis 1a.   
4.2.2. External governance  




For the pre-reform period, Model 2A does not yield much support for Hypothesis 2a. 
Ownership concentration does not seem to affect the performance sensitivity of CEO turnover. In 
particular, neither an analysis with outsider ownership concentration (Model 2A), nor a more detailed 
analysis (not shown) with ownership concentration held by institutions (banks, pensions funds, mutual 
and investment funds, insurance companies), families and individuals not related to a director, other 
corporations, and the government give evidence of outside shareholder monitoring. In some models 
which do not include the internal governance mechanisms, strong insider control implies a higher 
probability that the CEO will not be removed. Executive directors with large ownership stakes appear 
able to successfully ward off any attempts to replace the CEO regardless of corporate performance. As 
these results are not robust in larger models, they are not reported. Model 2A of Table 3 shows that the 
size of the shareholdings controlled by non-executive directors does not have a direct impact on the 
likelihood of CEO turnover. Interestingly, however, the significance of the interaction term between the 
non-executives’ stake and past stock performance indicates that non-executive directors tend to protect 
the CEOs of firms whose stock underperformed (which is in line with the findings by Franks et al. 
[29]). This result further illustrates the lack of monitoring by non-executive directors. Thus, poor 
performance may not only be the result of poor management, but maybe also of poor external corporate 
governance. 
The situation for the post-reform period is similar: contrary to what Hypothesis 2a postulates, 
there is no strong link between ownership structures and the likelihood of managerial turnover in the 
post-reform period. Virtually all the coefficients corresponding to ownership variables or their 
interactions in selection equations of Models 2B, and 2C are not statistically significant.  
Finally, our control variables reveal that, over the pre-reform period, CEOs of larger firms were 
more able to maintain their position, whereas in the post-reform period, CEOs seem to be more easily 
disciplined in larger firms. Capital gearing does not affect the likelihood of CEO turnover, while CEOs 
of risky firms are less likely to lose their jobs in post-reform period.  
4.3. Sample selection model results for CEO compensation 
4.3.1. Internal governance  




We study the relation between top management remuneration, and performance and governance 
variables in both periods in Panel B of Table 3 (Models 2A-C). The impact of board size is consistently 
significant: CEOs of firms with large boards receive a larger compensation in both the pre-reform and 
post-reform periods. This effect is not performance-dependent in the pre-reform sample, while in the 
more recent period, the presence of larger boards strengthens the link between compensation and stock 
performance. Stronger abnormal returns are followed by higher monetary and total compensation 
(which distinguishes our results from those obtained for the US by [67]).  
In the pre-reform period (Model 2A), a high proportion of non-executive directors, the presence 
of a remuneration committee, the separation of the functions of the CEO and the chairman do not seem 
related to the way managerial remuneration contracts are drawn up. The only statistically significant 
effect in this part of the analysis is the interaction of the CEO-Chairman indicator with accounting 
performance. Apparently, in the pre-reform period, the remuneration of those CEOs who also act as 
chairmen of the board, is more sensitive to the return on assets. A possible interpretation may be that 
powerful executives are able to have accounting performance adopted as the performance yardstick on 
which their remuneration will be partially based. Due to the large degree of discretion that powerful 
CEOs can enjoy, they could have been able to manipulate this benchmark in the pre-reform period by 
means of specific accounting choices for a number of years. Finally, the presence of a remuneration 
committee (consisting of non-executive directors) does not have a significant impact on CEO 
compensation in the pre-reform period.  
In the post-reform period, Models 2B and 2C (see Panel B) demonstrate that CEOs who are 
members of boards with a larger proportion of non-executive directors enjoy higher levels of both 
monetary and total compensation. Board independence hardly matters for the performance sensitivity of 
CEO remuneration in the post-reform period. The only exception is the statistically significant 
coefficient for the corresponding to one of the interaction terms in Model 2B: it suggests that the 
presence of a substantial number of non-executive directors on the board weakens the link between 
monetary compensation and accounting performance. While the focus of the governance reforms 
implemented in the UK in the 1990s was amongst others to strengthen the role of non-executive 
directors, our results do not confirm any notable improvement in the governance efficiency of this 




mechanism. CEO-Chairman duality does not appear to affect either the level of managerial pay or its 
performance-sensitivity in the post-reform period.20 Overall, we find little relation between board 
structure and compensation in either of the periods analyzed and therefore, we reject Hypothesis 1b.  
4.3.2. External governance 
We show for both the pre-reform and post-reform periods that, when executive directors hold 
large share stakes, the CEO’s monetary remuneration is lower (Panel B of Table 3). It may be that when 
executive directors derive substantial wealth from their equity investments in their corporation, they 
care less about their monetary income. Still, for the pre-reform period, we find that when stock prices 
decrease, CEOs seem to compensate disappointing stock returns by augmenting their monetary 
compensation. Thus, Model 2A illustrates a pernicious remuneration incentive scheme by which CEOs 
receive a higher monetary compensation in the wake of poor stock performance of firms in which they 
can exert considerable voting power. Notably, this effect has disappeared in the post-reform sample. 
Still, given that the levels of compensation are lower in firms with powerful executive directors, we 
cannot fully support the managerial power (or the skimming) model for executive compensation as 
formulated by Bebchuk and Fried [7]. 
When outside shareholders hold share blocks, CEO compensation appears to be lower (see 
Models 2A-C). However, outside shareholders do not seem to impose an effective pay-for-performance 
remuneration scheme, as the interaction of the size of the outside blockholdings with corporate 
performance is not statistically significant.21 It may well be that pay-for-performance schemes and 
                                                 
20 Only Model 2B suggests that CEOs who are also chairmen enjoy higher levels of cash-based compensation, but 
this effect is only marginally significant. We do not analyze the impact of the presence of a remuneration 
committee on compensation in the post-reform period. Following the recommendations of the governance codes, 
virtually all the firms have established such a committee by 1999 (i.e. the year when the post-reform sample 
starts). 
21 An analysis of the different types of outside blockholders does not give any significant results, apart from the 
fact that CEOs’ compensation is less sensitive to the accounting-based benchmark in firms with a high proportion 
of equity controlled by financial institutions.  




shareholder control are supplementary monitoring mechanisms. Consequently, we only find partial 
evidence supporting Hypothesis 2b: there is no evidence that CEO remuneration is more performance-
related in outsider-dominated firms, but strong director control concentration leads to a lower 
performance sensitivity of CEO remuneration in the pre-reform years.  
Finally, the size of the equity stakes controlled by non-executive directors is negatively related 
to the level of monetary CEO pay for both the pre-reform and post-reform periods (see Models 2A and 
2B, Panel B of Table 3). Apparently, in companies where non-executive directors are less powerful (in 
terms of voting power), the CEO is more likely to enjoy higher levels of compensation. Still, powerful 
non-executive directors do not impose a performance-related remuneration scheme on the management 
as the interaction terms are not statistically significant.  
Table 3 (Panel B) also provides some interesting insights concerning the impact of firm-specific 
control variables (size, gearing and risk) on CEO remuneration. In line with the UK remuneration 
literature (see e.g. [34]), CEOs of larger firms enjoy significantly higher industry-adjusted monetary 
compensation and higher total compensation. Top management usually tries to justify – rightly so or not 
– size-related compensation by the fact that special managerial skills (which are in short supply) are 
needed to manage larger firms. We also document that firm leverage has no impact on compensation in 
the pre-reform period. In more recent years, highly levered firms tend to pay their CEOs less.  
Our results show that CEO remuneration increases with corporate risk. Aggarwal and Samwick 
[2], and Jin [44] argue that in an agency framework, managerial risk aversion implies that firm risk 
moderates the performance sensitivity of executive compensation. We verified this claim and expanded 
our models with interaction terms of company risk and performance (tables are available upon request). 
As none of these interaction terms are statistically significant, we fail to corroborate the risk hypotheses 
of the above studies. 
4.4. Sample selection model vs. fixed-effect panel regression 
Panels C of Tables 2 and 3 report the estimates of the correlation coefficients of the error terms 
in the selection and regression equations. The fact that those estimates are highly significant in most 
specifications confirms that an analysis of compensation performance-sensitivity based on a simple 
regression framework (OLS or fixed-effects estimations on a censored sample) is likely to suffer from a 




severe selection bias (see Section 3.3 above). In particular, ignoring the selectivity resulting from 
disciplinary CEO turnover can substantially bias the estimated strength of the remuneration rewarding 
effect (and of the impact of other covariates). Tables 4 and 5 illustrate this point: they report the 
estimates of panel data fixed-effect models explaining industry-adjusted CEO monetary and total 
compensation for the sample of CEOs who are at least one year in place (so, we also exclude CEOs 
who are newly appointed as was also done in the sample selection model discussed above). Models 3A-
C of Table 4 and Models 4A-C of Table 5 correspond respectively to Models 1A-C of Table 2 and 
Models 2A-C of Table 3.  
Table 2 indicates that, as a consequence of ignoring the problem of sample selection, the 
statistical inference may lead to spurious conclusions. Based on the evidence of Table 4, we would 
reject the hypothesis predicting a significant relationship between past accounting performance and 
CEO compensation in all of the Models 3A-C. The significance of stock performance sensitivity of 
remuneration survives in some models, but the coefficient estimates are much lower than those reported 
in Table 2 which indicates that these fixed-effects results underestimate the true economic significance 
of the relations. The discrepancies between the parameter estimates obtained by these two estimation 
methods are even more outspoken for some other regressors (e.g. for the firm size variable), as can be 
observed in Table 5. These findings may explain the differences in conclusions between our analysis 
(based on a sample selection model) and earlier UK compensation studies based on simple OLS or 
fixed effects (e.g. [18]). This also suggests caution in interpreting the evidence on remuneration of past 
studies.    
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
5. Additional analyses and robustness tests  
5.1. The effects of top management classification  
 Whereas in the majority of UK firms, the identity of the CEO is undisputable, on other cases it 
is sometimes difficult to find out who is the (acting) CEO.  If none of the executive directors carries the 
title of CEO, but there is a managing director, we consider the latter as CEO. If none of the board 
members hold a title of CEO or managing director while the board has an executive chairman, we 




consider this person as the CEO. As a robustness check for the post-reform period, we have also 
implemented an alternative approach (in line with that adopted by some earlier UK compensation 
studies, e.g. [34]) and have constructed a database where the highest paid executive director in a given 
firm year is labeled a CEO. Not surprisingly as the overlap between the two databases (employing 
different classifications) exceeds 93%, this alternative approach yields the results (available upon 
request) virtually identical to those reported in the text.  
5.2. The effects of equity-based CEO remuneration in the pre-reform period. 
 For the pre-reform period, we have only shown the results for the cash component of CEO 
remuneration. Reliable data on the other elements of executive compensation (equity-based 
compensation, mainly LTIPs and option grants) are scarce as prior to the Greenbury report, most firms 
only reported the base salary and bonus of the CEO. We also employed all available data to verify 
whether the presence of equity-based components of CEO’s remuneration affect the conclusions drawn 
in Section 4.  
 We first construct proxies to capture the importance of option/stock grants awarded to the CEO. 
A first proxy for the size of such grants was calculated as the difference between the CEO’s equity 
holdings in years t and t – 1, if the difference was positive and zero otherwise. This variable is positive 
for only about 9% of the CEO-years in the sample.22 For this subsample, the median (average) size of 
the grant was 0.5% (2.7%, respectively) of the equity outstanding. Second, we construct a proxy to 
measure the value of CEO’s stock grants. It was obtained by multiplying the size of the grant (defined 
above) by the market capitalization of the relevant firm. In the subsample of CEO-years where the 
proxy for the stock grant size is non-negative, the median (average) value of such a grant is about 
£283,000 (£11.73m, respectively). Third, we calculate the wealth effects of CEOs’ equity holdings in 
                                                 
22 It may be the case that CEOs who are awarded stock grants sell their shares immediately following the grant 
[58]. If it is the case, our proxy underestimates the importance of such option grants. Another important source of 
noise is that this proxy does not only capture the stock awarded to the CEO resulting from a stock grant, but also 
the shares acquired by the CEO and financed from his or her personal wealth as well as the stock obtained as a 
result of the exercise of stock options. Consequently, the proxy may overestimate the size of the stock grants 
awarded to the CEO in a given year as well. 




order to obtain a direct measure of incentives resulting from managerial stock ownership.23 Such 
variables allow us to control for the possibility of ex post settling up in the bargaining between a CEO 
and the body responsible for remuneration-setting. More specifically, the board of directors (or the 
remuneration committee) who stipulate the terms of the CEO compensation may take into account the 
capital gains or losses experienced by the CEO over the previous year and adjust the monetary element 
of the remuneration package accordingly. Finally, we construct a dummy variable that equals one for 
the firm-years in which the CEO was granted stock options and zero otherwise.24 On average 73% of 
the firms reported that their CEOs received a stock option package. 
 In order to verify robustness of conclusions drawn in Section 4, we extend Models 1A and 2A 
using the four proxy variables discussed above.25 This allows us to examine the determinants of the 
CEO’s monetary compensation, while controlling for non-cash components of the remuneration 
package.26 Not surprisingly, the size of the stock grant (i.e. the percentage of equity awarded to CEO) is 
negatively related to the level of a CEO’s monetary compensation, but the corresponding coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. The results are stronger for the value of new stock grants: the corresponding 
coefficient is significantly negative in some models. The negative relationship is intuitive: non-
monetary elements of a CEO compensation package appear (imperfect) substitutes for monetary 
remuneration. Importantly, the extended models (including the proxies for the new stock grants) still 
support all the conclusions drawn from Models 1A and 2A.  
                                                 
23 Two versions of the wealth effect variable were computed. The ‘raw wealth effect’ is obtained by multiplying 
the value of the CEO’s equity stake by the raw stock return over the last year. For ‘abnormal wealth effect’, we 
multiply the value of the CEO’s equity stake by the abnormal stock return over the last year.  
24 Information on neither the size of those grants nor about the terms of the options granted (e.g. exercise price, 
vesting period) was available. Moreover, our proxy may underestimate the importance of the grants, since the 
disclosure of such awards was not mandatory in the analyzed period. 
25 The corresponding estimation results are not tabulated in the text and are available upon request.  
26 This approach is similar to the one applied by Yermack [66]. His regressions explaining executives’ perquisite 
consumptions control for other forms of compensation.  




 We find no relationship between the wealth effects of CEO equity holdings and the level of 
monetary compensation enjoyed by a particular CEO. The models employing proxies for wealth effects 
of CEO equity holdings still corroborate earlier findings. Finally, awarding a CEO with an option grant 
does not affect the level of CEO monetary compensation. Therefore, we conclude that the models 
extended with information on the equity-based remuneration corroborate our earlier conclusions. 
5.3. Alternative variable specifications in the simultaneous equations estimation. 
5.3.1. Corporate performance 
 We substitute unadjusted ROA and (yearly) changes in EBIT for our accounting performance 
measure and obtain similar results both in the regression and the selection equation. Alternative 
measures of stock performance (dividend changes as a signal of future value and Tobin's Q) correlate 
positively with remuneration in the regression equations, but do not seem to be used as a benchmark to 
remove the CEO. Finally, we extend the models by including two-year lags of the performance 
indicators. In most of the specifications, both the accounting- and market-based proxies lagged two 
years are insignificant, which implies that only recent performance information is used in the decision 
to dismiss or remunerate.  
5.3.2. Leverage 
The results are also robust to the choice of leverage proxy (book or market value), as none of 
the conclusions is challenged in these alternative specifications. Extending the models by firm-specific 
control variables capturing the changes in capital structure (such as a dummy variable for firms issuing 
new equity) does not materially affect the results.  
5.3.3. Model extensions by CEO age 
Several studies argue that CEO age is one of the crucial determinants of compensation and of 
turnover. We expand the models in Tables 2 and 3 by including CEO age and find that this variable has 
no impact on CEO compensation in either the pre-reform or the post-reform period (the corresponding 
coefficients are usually positive, though statistically insignificant). While for the pre-reform period we 




also find that older CEOs are less likely to suffer from forced replacement27, this result does not hold in 
the post-reform period as the relation between the CEO age and turnover is then insignificant. None of 
the other results presented in Tables 2 and 3 are challenged by the inclusion of age variable.  
6. Conclusion and discussion  
We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market: CEO turnover and 
remuneration schemes. Sample selection models are applied to firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange over two periods of six years: 1988-1993 representing the period prior to the main changes in 
corporate governance regulation (the Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel reports which were bundled in 
the Combined Code) and the post-reform period of 1999-2004. Our approach yields some novel results 
compared to earlier UK research: the managerial remuneration and the termination of labor contracts 
play an important role in mitigating agency problems between managers and shareholders. We find that 
both the CEO’s industry-adjusted compensation and CEO replacement are performance-sensitive. Top 
executive turnover is shown to serve as a disciplinary mechanism in case of corporate 
underperformance, whereas the level of CEO compensation rewards good past performance although 
the performance criterion chosen depends to some extent on the ownership concentration and board 
structure. Especially our results on remuneration go against most past UK findings which had unveiled 
little pay-for-performance sensitivity, possibly due to biases introduced by inappropriate estimation 
techniques and an incorrect choice of remuneration measures and performance benchmarks.   
Our analysis of CEO compensation reveals that CEOs are rewarded for corporate size and risk, 
but also for good accounting and stock price performance. The fact that the levels of remuneration are 
lower when executive directors are more powerful (in terms of voting rights) supports the alignment of 
interest-hypothesis which states that managerial ownership aligns the objectives of management and of 
other shareholders. However, for the pre-reform period we also find that, when CEOs derive substantial 
wealth from the equity investment in their firms and when stock prices decrease and negative abnormal 
                                                 
27 The reason why we do not present these additional results in Tables 2 and 3 is that the CEO age variable is not 
disclosed for about one third of our sample firms for the pre-reform period. 
 




returns are incurred, these CEOs seem to compensate the disappointing stock performance by 
augmenting their monetary compensation package (salary and bonus). This suggests self-dealing and 
hence provides some support for an alternative theory, namely the skimming or managerial power 
hypothesis [7, 11]. In the pre-reform period, CEOs who also exert the function of chairman of the board 
had more discretion over this benchmark and hence over their monetary compensation. In contrast, in 
firms with strong outsider (monitoring) shareholders, the management cannot pick its preferred 
performance benchmark as they are required to focus on the creation of shareholder value. The 
aforementioned problems of self-dealing in firms with powerful executives do not persist in the post-
reform years, which implies some improvement in corporate governance standards in the more recent 
regulatory regime. 
In both periods, the CEOs of monitored firms (in particular in firms where non-executive 
directors and outside shareholders control large share blocks) enjoy lower remuneration, irrespective of 
performance. Moreover, in the pre-reform period, there are few characteristics of the board structure 
(apart from the separation of CEO and chairman) which have an impact on the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. Neither the proportion of non-executive directors on the board nor the presence of a 
remuneration committee seem to have any impact on the remuneration policy of the firm. Interestingly, 
in the post-reform period, a larger board size is associated with a higher sensitivity of remuneration to 
stock performance, whereas a larger proportion of non-executive directors on the board weakens the 
link between CEO compensation and accounting performance measure. Overall, our results in this 
respect appear consistent with the widely perceived failure of internal governance mechanism in 
tackling the agency problems associated with managerial pay:  
Ten years ago company boards set up remuneration committees to restrain greedy chief executives 
and make the salary setting process more transparent. Yet the excesses seem to have increased as a 
result. The committees create a veneer of respectability that protects chief executives from direct 
accountability. They rely on salary surveys and often use absurd overseas comparisons to justify 
huge salaries for UK-based executives. The committees generally want their chief executives to be 
paid an above-average wage, thereby creating an inflationary spiral… [B]ecause many chief 




executives sit on each other’s remuneration committees, there is a suspicion of mutual back-
scratching (The Financial Times, May 20, 2003).  
The implementation of the governance codes’ guidelines has not resulted in increased CEO 
turnover rates: the dismissal probabilities appear comparable in the pre- and post-reform periods. We 
also document CEO dismissal to be performance-sensitive in both pre- and post-reform periods. There 
is little evidence of disciplinary monitoring by powerful outsider shareholders: institutions, families, or 
individuals, other corporations do not seem to be more apt to remove CEOs even in the wake of poor 
performance in either period. This finding is consistent with the sentiment recently expressed in the 
press:  
The sad fact is that although reforms over the last few years have improved the transparency and 
accountability of firms to their shareholders, there hasn’t been a corresponding increase in 
incentives or requirements for investors to act on the information provided. Asking questions about 
risks and long-term prospects of the companies they invested in makes good business sense for 
pension funds, insurers and savers. Some major investors and fund managers are taking on this 
challenge, but it is only through being consistently challenged and questioned by pension fund 
trustees that kind of responsible ownership will become the norm (The Financial Times, February 
23, 2009).  
In line with earlier research, we find that in the pre-reform period non-executive directors 
owning share blocks seem to protect the incumbent CEO in poorly performing companies, while in the 
post-reform period this effect is no longer significant (suggesting some improvement in governance 
standards following the implementation of codes’ guidelines). In the pre-reform period, the lack of 
CEO-chairman duality in many firms fostered managerial entrenchment: prior to 1993 CEOs also 
holding the positions of chairmen of the board successfully impeded their replacement regardless of 
corporate performance. This confirms that the intention of the codes’ governance guidelines to 
eliminate such types of entrenchment was entirely justified. Unfortunately, not all the codes’ 
recommendations have yielded such beneficial effects. For instance, while prior to 1993 boards with a 
high proportion of non-executive directors replaced CEOs more frequently, this aspect of board 
independence does not appear to have had any effect on CEO dismissal in the post-reform period. 




Hence, we conclude all the regulatory effort undertaken in the UK over the 1990s has had at best 
moderate effect on increasing executives’ accountability and performance sensitivity of their forced 
turnover.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.  
  Pre-reform sample: 1988-1993 Post-reform sample: 1999-2004 
  Median  Mean Std. dev. Median  Mean Std. dev. 
 CEO turnover 
CEO dismissal (%) 0.0 11.0 31.3 0.0 9.9 29.9 
  
CEO compensation 
Ind.-adj. logarithm of cash compensation 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Logarithm of cash compensation 11.9 11.9 0.7 12.7 12.7 0.8 
Ind.-adj. logarithm of total compensation na na na 0.0 0.1 0.9 
Logarithm of total compensation na na na 12.9 13.0 1.0 
  
CEO characteristics 
CEO age (years) 52.0 52.6 6.3 51.0 50.5 7.5 
CEO tenure (years) 4.0 5.2 5.3 2.9 4.9 5.4 
CEO is the board chairman (%) 0.0 33.5 47.2 0.0 15.4 36.1 
  
Board composition 
Proportion of non-executive directors (%) 61.5 61.4 15.0 50.0 50.1 14.6 
Board size 9.0 9.4 3.5 7.0 7.7 2.8 
Remuneration committee presence (dummy) 0.0 25.9 43.8 100 100 na 
  
Ownership variables (all in %) 
CEO stake (%) 0.0 3.0 8.1 0.0 4.5 11.7 
Executives’ stake (%) 0.1 4.6 10.8 1.3 6.0 11.4 
Non-executives’ stake (%)  0.0 3.9 9.6 0.0 3.0 8.7 
Institutions’ stake (%) 13.0 16.6 16.1 22.5 24.6 17.7 
Families/indiv.’s and corporations’ stake (%) 0.0 8.2 14.1 0.0 5.2 11.0 
  
Firm-specific control variables 
Logarithm of firm size  11.3 11.3 1.8 11.9 12.0 2.3 
Capital gearing (%) 29.7 32.7 24.8 16.5 21.4 46.2 
Risk (%) 34.4 37.4 13.1 30.4 33.0 13.2 
 
 




Table 2. Sample selection models explaining CEO turnover and industry-adjusted 
compensation.  
 Model 1A: Pre-reform Model 1B: Post-reform Model 1C: Post-reform 
Panel A: Selection equations Dependent variable equals 0 if the CEO is replaced and 1 otherwise. 
 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept 3.27605 0.000 2.22414 0.000 1.94549 0.000 
 Performance indicators 
Abnormal stock returns in year t-1 0.00332 0.076 0.04218 0.477 0.05188 0.371 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year t-1 0.00425 0.211 0.00711 0.004 0.00589 0.017 
 Firm size, leverage, and risk 
Firm size -0.09618 0.027 -0.08378 0.000 -0.06409 0.001 
Capital gearing -0.00256 0.229 0.00055 0.792 0.00111 0.600 
Risk -0.00603 0.286 0.00297 0.457 0.00472 0.224 
 Year and industry control variables 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Wald 2 2(20) = 104.29 2(20) = 102.41 2(20) = 103.62  
P-value for 2  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Panel B: Regression equations  






 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept -3.06839 0.000 -3.02736 0.000 -3.93953 0.000 
 Performance indicators 
Abnormal stock returns in year t-1 0.00116 0.009 0.05319 0.006 0.06694 0.015 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year t-1 0.00420 0.008 0.00296 0.015 0.00277 0.074 
 Firm size, leverage, and risk 
Firm size 0.24891 0.000 0.22409 0.000 0.28719 0.000 
Capital gearing 0.00086 0.356 -0.00205 0.075 -0.00165 0.250 
Risk 0.00535 0.038 0.00966 0.000 0.01341 0.000 
 Year control variables 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Wald 2 2(9) = 307.05  2(9) = 449.80 2(9) = 424.28 
P-value for 2  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Panel C: Model statistics and tests    
Total no. of observations 868 2282 2277 
No. of censored observations 102 314 314 
No. of uncensored observations 766 1968 1963 
Log-likelihood -658.71 -2255.21 -2728.93 
Wald 2 statistics for testing  
joint significance of two equations 
2(29) = 676.33 2(29) = 822.22 2(29) = 780.08 
P-value for 2 < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Estimate of ρ 0.881 0.774 0.839 
Wald 2 statistics for testing ρ = 0 
(tests of equations independence) 
2(1) = 69.32 2(1) = 22.62 2(1) =  37.68 
P-value for 2 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 




Table 3. Sample selection models explaining CEO turnover and industry-adjusted 
compensation.  
 Model 2A: Pre-reform Model 2B: Post-Reform Model 2C: Post-Reform 
 
Panel A: Selection equations 
 
Dependent variable equals 0 if the CEO is replaced and 1 otherwise. 
 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept 4.03002 0.003 1.47579 0.000 1.17269 0.003 
  
Performance indicators 
Abnormal stock returns in year t-1 0.00654 0.019 0.68673 0.187 0.60951 0.174 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year t-1 0.00907 0.315 0.01338 0.523 0.00695 0.751 
  
Board composition 
Board size  -0.95282 0.008 0.11349 0.484 0.14205 0.358 
Stock price perform. * Board size 0.00395 0.517 -0.25591 0.229 -0.20581 0.305 
Accounting perform. * Board size 0.01521 0.223 -0.01108 0.282 -0.00893 0.398 
Proportion of non-executive directors -0.01339 0.024 0.00314 0.321 0.00435 0.173 
Stock price perform. * Prop. of non-executives -0.00008 0.574 -0.00201 0.658 -0.00225 0.604 
Accounting perform. * Prop. of non-executives -0.00013 0.679 0.00028 0.194 0.00032 0.168 
CEO is also the chairman 0.30943 0.049 -0.27086 0.038 -0.34720 0.005 
Stock price perf. * CEO is also the chairman -0.00278 0.632 0.01375 0.935 -0.05373 0.720 
Accounting perf. * CEO is also the chairman -0.00367 0.721 0.00835 0.325 0.01030 0.175 
  
Ownership concentration 
Executives’ stakes 0.05166 0.178 0.00506 0.166 0.00487 0.181 
Stock price perform. * Executives’  stakes 0.00037 0.188 -0.00038 0.952 -0.00060 0.921 
Accounting perform. * Executives’ stakes -0.00047 0.512 -0.00002 0.924 -0.00004 0.864 
Outside block holdings -0.00476 0.283 -0.00212 0.364 -0.00246 0.297 
Stock price perform. * Outside block holdings -0.00006 0.611 0.00187 0.665 -0.00025 0.952 
Accounting perform. * Outside block holdings 0.00003 0.907 -0.00017 0.073 -0.00016 0.095 
Non-executives’ stakes 0.00375 0.614 -0.00523 0.277 -0.00405 0.408 
Stock price perform. * Non-executives’ stakes -0.00045 0.004 -0.00533 0.533 -0.00453 0.597 
Accounting perform. * Non-executives’ stakes -0.00016 0.805 -0.00010 0.789 -0.00034 0.444 
  
Firm size, leverage, and risk 
Firm size 0.10879 0.105 -0.09294 0.001 -0.07260 0.010 
Capital gearing 0.00010 0.977 0.00048 0.826 0.00015 0.940 
Risk -0.00633 0.416 0.00713 0.043 0.00842 0.015 
  
Year and industry control variables 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Wald 2 2(38) = 153.55 2(38) = 156.85 2(38) = 143.55 
P-value for 2 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Table continues on next page. 




Table 3 - continued. 
 Model 2A: Pre-reform Model 2B: Post-reform Model 2C: Post-reform 
 
Panel B: Regression equations 
 
 






 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept -3.20470 0.000 -3.09582 0.000 -3.94607 0.000 
 Performance indicators 
Abnormal stock returns in year t-1 0.00287 0.001 -0.10655 0.186 -0.03572 0.751 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year t-1 0.00310 0.194 0.01833 0.052 0.01008 0.503 
 Board composition 
Board size  0.20572 0.009 0.27508 0.001 0.31036 0.002 
Stock price perform. * Board size -0.00087 0.486 0.05426 0.041 0.06881 0.054 
Accounting perform. * Board size 0.00116 0.760 -0.00131 0.742 0.00274 0.655 
Proportion of non-executive directors 0.00214 0.264 0.00609 0.000 0.00802 0.000 
Stock price perform. * Prop. of non-executives 0.00005 0.234 0.00149 0.290 0.00004 0.983 
Accounting perform. * Prop. of non-executives  -0.00001 0.924 -0.00021 0.048 -0.00020 0.213 
CEO is also the chairman 0.02154 0.680 0.12420 0.092 0.00794 0.926 
Stock price perf. * CEO is also the chairman -0.00074 0.471 -0.03780 0.480 -0.10197 0.113 
Accounting perf. * CEO is also the chairman 0.00699 0.041 0.00129 0.743 0.00331 0.487 
Remuneration committee presence 0.00151 0.973 Dropped Dropped 
Stock price perform.  
* Remuneration committee presence -0.00135 0.359 Dropped Dropped 
Accounting perform.  
* Remuneration committee presence 0.00049 0.866 Dropped Dropped 
 Ownership concentration 
Executives’ stakes -0.00468 0.031 -0.00517 0.001 -0.00694 0.000 
Stock price perform. * Executives’  stakes -0.00010 0.025 -0.00090 0.522 -0.00163 0.409 
Accounting perform. * Executives’ stakes 0.00010 0.460 -0.00006 0.579 -0.00007 0.610 
Outside block holdings -0.00332 0.049 -0.00178 0.100 -0.00272 0.057 
Stock price perform. * Outside block holdings -0.00001 0.829 -0.00079 0.526 -0.00182 0.263 
Accounting perform. * Outside block holdings -0.00003 0.694 -0.00007 0.080 -0.00004 0.499 
Non-executives’ stakes -0.00506 0.023 -0.00471 0.048 -0.00414 0.245 
Stock price perform. * Non-executives’ stakes -0.00003 0.501 -0.00255 0.282 -0.00249 0.490 
Accounting perform. * Non-executives’ stakes -0.00005 0.701 -0.00014 0.368 -0.00025 0.439 
 Firm size, leverage, and risk 
Firm size 0.20799 0.000 0.17260 0.000 0.22374 0.000 
Capital gearing 0.00034 0.699 -0.00277 0.014 -0.00294 0.030 
Risk 0.00862 0.003 0.00744 0.000 0.01041 0.000 
 Year control variables 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Wald 2 2(30) = 481.57 2(27) = 591.29 2(27) = 546.76 
P-value for 2 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Table continues on next page. 




Table 3 - continued. 
 Model 2A: Pre-reform Model 2B: Post-reform Model 2C: Post-reform 
 
Panel C: Model statistics and tests 
   
Total no. of observations 847 1909 1905 
No. of censored observations 101 300 300 
No. of uncensored observations 746 1609 1605 
Log-likelihood -550.00 -1746.53 -2149.73 
Wald 2 statistics for testing  
joint significance of two equations 
 
2(68) = 964.06 
2(65) = 1322.83  
2(65) = 1096.07 
P-value for 2 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Estimate of ρ -0.660 0.936 0.942 
Wald 2 statistics for testing ρ = 0 
(tests of equations independence) 
 
2(1) = 1.10   
 
2(1) = 185.38 
 
2(1) = 166.45 
P-value for 2 0.2953 < 0.001 < 0.001 
 




Table 4. Fixed-effect panel regressions explaining CEO industry-adjusted compensation 
for censored sample (CEOs who are not newly appointed).  
 Model 3A: Pre-reform Model 3B: Post-reform Model 3C: Post-reform 
Panel A: Model estimates 
   






 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept -0.34233 0.299 -3.10998 0.000 -3.54278 0.000 
 
Performance indicators 
Abnormal stock returns in year t-1 0.00094 0.001 0.02169 0.096 0.01629 0.404 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year t-1 -0.00009 0.889 0.00069 0.340 0.00025 0.816 
 
Firm size, leverage, and risk 
Firm size 0.04280 0.110 0.23682 0.000 0.26992 0.000 
Capital gearing -0.00033 0.593 0.00173 0.060 0.00438 0.002 
Risk -0.00224 0.215 0.00586 0.010 0.00642 0.059 
 
Other control variables 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Model statistics and tests 
   
 0.536 0.476 0.573 
e 0.201 0.283 0.424 
 0.877 0.739 0.646 
F-test for all i = 0 F(215,558) = 11.93 F(723,1310) = 6.86 F(721,1307) = 4.54 
P-value for F < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Corr(i, Xb) 0.457 -0.079 0.001 
Model F-test  F(9,558) = 7.96  F(9,1310) = 38.78 F(9,1307) = 20.95 
P-value for F  < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
R2 - within 0.114 0.210 0.126 
R2 - between 0.406 0.489 0.505 
R2 - overall 0.327 0.440 0.428 
No. of groups 216 724 722 
No. of observations 783 2043 2038 
 




 Table 5. Fixed-effect panel regressions explaining CEO industry-adjusted compensation 
for censored sample (CEOs who are not newly appointed).  
 Model 4A: Pre-reform Model 4B: Post-reform Model 4C: Post-reform 
Panel A: Model estimates 
   






 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept -0.16453 0.661 -3.08505 0.000 -3.06675 0.000 
 
Performance indicators 
Abnormal stock returns in year t-1 0.00043 0.400 -0.09640 0.105 -0.08536 0.343 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year t-1 0.00152 0.254 0.00711 0.306 0.00249 0.813 
 
Board composition 
Board size  -0.00695 0.915 0.13814 0.078 0.10680 0.369 
Stock price performance * Board size 0.00113 0.194 0.08933 0.000 0.09567 0.002 
Accounting performance * Board size 0.00468 0.077 -0.00186 0.503 0.00196 0.641 
Proportion of non-executive directors 0.00172 0.158 0.00234 0.111 0.00503 0.024 
Stock price performance  
* Proportion of non-executives 
0.00001 0.608 
-0.00043 0.705 -0.00100 0.561 
Accounting performance  
* Proportion of non-executives 
-0.00005 0.314 
-0.00008 0.204 -0.00015 0.118 
CEO is also the chairman -0.00783 0.805 0.09724 0.322 0.11932 0.422 
Stock price perf. * CEO is also the chairman 0.00037 0.540 -0.09925 0.020 -0.15258 0.018 
Accounting perf. * CEO is also the chairman -0.00112 0.588 0.00405 0.174 0.00625 0.166 
Remuneration committee presence -0.01070 0.706 Dropped Dropped 
Stock price performance  
* Remuneration committee presence 
0.00113 0.087 Dropped Dropped 
Accounting performance  
* Remuneration committee presence 
-0.00109 0.404 Dropped Dropped 
 
Ownership concentration 
Executives’ stakes -0.00800 0.001 -0.00636 0.013 -0.00978 0.011 
Stock price perform. * Executives’  stakes 0.00002 0.357 -0.00080 0.560 -0.00003 0.989 
Accounting perform. * Executives’ stakes -0.00007 0.423 0.00007 0.390 0.00006 0.648 
Outside block holdings -0.00071 0.431 -0.00035 0.754 0.00010 0.951 
Stock price perf. * Outside block holdings -0.00001 0.468 -0.00115 0.227 -0.00353 0.014 
Accounting perf. * Outside block holdings -0.00009 0.024 0.00001 0.729 0.00005 0.304 
Non-executives’ stakes -0.00234 0.306 -0.00303 0.377 -0.00810 0.118 
Stock price perform. * Non-executives’ stakes -0.00005 0.131 -0.00247 0.212 -0.00384 0.200 
Accounting perform. * Non-executives’ stakes 0.00016 0.048 0.00018 0.107 0.00030 0.071 
 
Firm size, leverage, and risk 
Firm size 0.01892 0.504 0.21817 0.000 0.22582 0.000 
Capital gearing -0.00008 0.897 0.00076 0.518 0.00204 0.253 
Risk -0.00061 0.754 0.00452 0.073 0.00160 0.674 
 
Other control variables 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Table continues on next page. 




Table 5 - continued. 
 Model 4A: Pre-reform Model 4B: Post-reform Model 4C: Post-reform 
Panel B: Model statistics and tests 
   
 0.544 0.448 0.556 
e 0.195 0.265 0.401 
 0.886 0.741 0.658 
F-test for all i = 0 F(213,519) = 11.63  F(665,986) = 6.18 F(663,984) = 4.04 
P-value for F < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Corr(i, Xb) 0.196 -0.118 0.008 
Model F-test  F(30,519) = 3.59 F(27,986) = 9.86 F(27,984) = 5.67 
P-value for F  < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
R2 - within 0.172 0.213 0.135 
R2 - between 0.197 0.546 0.537 
R2 - overall 0.179 0.490 0.470 
No. of groups 214 666 664 
No. of observations 763 1679 1675 
 
 
 
